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number of contract carriers and mitigate the pressure of the
traffic on the highways of Texas.
Welcome as this decision is to the writer, meaning as it does
that the states need no longer continue the trial and error method
in the hope of getting a statute by the Supreme Court, it cannot
be denied that this is a classic example of judicial rationalizing.
It would better become the court frankly to assert the proposition
that changing conditions in the transportation field have necessi-
tated the abandonment of a concept of law which led only to chaos
in the field. The fallacy of the court's theory is its ignoring the
fact that most of the carriage which would have been done by the
unregulated contract carrier will be done under an equalizing of
competition, not by non-highway carriers but either by common
carriers by motor vehicle or by private trucks which the shippers
will purchase for their own use, both of which equally will wear
the highway. This indicates an insularity of mind which ill be-
comes the supreme tribunal.
Aside from its "far fetched" reasoning, however, the Binford
decision is auspicious and with ample economic justification.
Coming as it does at a time when existing transportation facilities
are greatly in excess of any effective demand possible in the im-
mediate future, it gives the states something of a free hand in co-
ordinating their transportation assets-to work the contract car-
rier into the comprehensive system of transportation in a man-
ner which will provide for adequate public service, and yet will
prevent tottering railroad valuations from further disaster.
Future state legislation will, in all probability, adopt the oppor-
tunity of incorporating into itself such a recital as that which
gave the court its cue for a change of heart in Stephenson v. Bin-ford. "Oh highway preservation! What regulations shall be
committed in thy name." HARRY W. JONES, '34.
THE SUABILITY OF AN UNINCORPORATED
ASSOCIATION IN MISSOURI
It appears to be a well settled rule of the common law that an
unincorporated association cannot maintain an action in its own
name,' but must sue or be sued in the names of the component
members,2 in the absence of a statute granting such powers.3
1 Francis v. Perry (1913) 144 N. Y. S. 167; Detroit Schuetzen Bund v.
Detroit Agitation Verein (1880) 44 Mich. 313, 6 N. W. 675.2 Lewelling v. Woodworkers Underwriters (1919) 140 Ark. 124, 128, 215
S. W. 258, 259; Westbrook v. Griffin (1906) 132 Iowa 185, 109 N. W. 608;
McMahon v. Rauhr (1871) 47 N. Y. 67.
3 Int'l Bro. Loc. Engineers v. Green (1921) 206 Ala. 196, 89 So. 435;
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The reason the courts have assigned for the rule is the unincor-
porated association's lack of an entity separate and distinct from
its members.4 The Missouri courts have reiterated this doctrine.5
That the only method for a group to acquire the power to sue
and be sued is through the aid of the corporate mechanism seems
to be the consequence of this rule. But upon examination it
would seem that the effect of this doctrine might be evaded in some
instances. An unincorporated association wishing the "suabil-
ity" attribute, which is generally considered as belonging solely
to the corporation or the individual, may create an express trust
in which the cestuis que trustent would be the members of the as-
sociation. The codes of many states, including Missouri, 6 author-
ize a trustee of an express trust to sue in his own name. Such
provisions have been held to apply to a trustee for the benefit of
the members of an unincorporated association. 7
That the Missouri courts have indulged in the "suability
dogma" is unquestionable, 8 but have they confined themselves
within the narrow limits the strict application of such a rule
would necessitate?
In 1908 the case of State v. Kansas City Live Stock Exchange9
came before the Supreme Court of Missouri. It was a suit by the
attorney general to enjoin the Live Stock Exchange, a voluntary
association composed of both individuals and corporations, from
practices which were alleged to be in restraint of trade. Judge
Valliant said, "the association as such has no legal entity, and
therefore can neither sue nor be sued, but in the case at bar the de-
fendants are the individuals and corporations that compose the
Exchange, and the name merely serves to distinguish those de-
fendants in their associated capacity". There seems to be some
subtle distinction between an association's suability and the right
to sue the aggregate members, using the association's name to des-
Barbour v. Albany Lodge (1884) 73 Ga. 474; Baskin v. United Mine Workers
(1921) 150 Ark. 398, 401, 234 S. W. 464; Warton v. Warner (1913) 75 Wash.
470, 135 Pac. 235; Hanley v. Elm Grove Mut. Tel. Co. (1911) 150 Iowa 198,
129 N. W. 807.
4Grand Grove etc. v. Garibaldi Grove (1900) 130 Cal. 16, 62 Pac. 486.
Newton County Fruit Growers v. Southern Ry. Co. (1930) 326 Mo. 617,
31 S. W. (2d) 803.
6 R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 699.
7Colley v. Wilson (1900) 86 Mo. App. 398; Kuhl v. Meyer (1889) 35 Mo.
App. 206; Kuhl v. Meyer (1892) 50 Mo. App. 648. The equitable "represen-
tative suit" seems also to avoid the effect of the general rule. McKenzie v.
L'Amoureux (N. Y. 1851) 11 Barb. 516; Penny v. Central Coal Co. (C. C. A.
8, 1905) 138 Fed. 769; Guilfoil v. Arthur (1895) 158 Ill. 600, 41 N. E. 1009;
Guske v. Anderson (1888) 77 Cal. 247, 19 Pac. 421.
9 Newton County Fruit Growers v. Southern R. Co. (1930) 326 Mo. 617, 31
S. W. (2d) 803.
9 (1908) 211 Mo. 181, 109 S. W. 675.
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ignate all members. However evasive that distinction may be,
it is clear that the court wished to reaffirm the common law doc-
trine, but also.allow suit against the association.
The case of Weir v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co.lo came be-
fore the Kansas City Court of Appeals. The plaintiff, in that
case, as president of the Adams Express Company (a joint stock
company) attempted to sue for damages sustained by the negli-
gence of the defendant's servant in running down a truck of the
Adams Express Company. In discussing the Company's ability
to sue, the Court said that while a joint stock company differs in
some respects from an ordinary business partnership and re-
sembles in some respects a corporation, yet it lacked the important
element of being a corporation, as it had not been made such by
the state. The court emphatically held that the Adams Express
Company could not maintain this suit in the name of the associa-
tion, nor in the name of its officers as trustees. The same parties
came before this court three years later." This time the joint
stock company was the defendant. The court, very consistently,
held that the Adams Express Company had no capacity to sue or
be sued. In the opinion the first case was reviewed, the court
finding no reason to change its holding since the first decision had
been rendered.
This same court, however, seven years later, allowed a suit
against a joint stock company. 12 The court based its decision on
two statutory provisions. One provided that a corporation shall
have the power to sue and be sued in any court of law or equity.13
The other provided that the term "corporation," as used in the
chapter of the statutes on corporations, shall include all joint
stock companies or associations having any powers or privileges
not possessed by individuals or partnerships. 14 Without point-
ing out what a "power or privilege" not possessed by individuals
or partnerships might be, the court said this company was so en-
dowed" and could therefore sue or be sued in the company name.
In rendering this decision the court did not pass over its opinion,
10 (1907) 126 Mo. App. 471, 103 S. W. 583.
11 etropolitan St. Ry. Co. v. Adams Exp. Co. (1910) 145 Mo. App. 371;
130 S. W. 101.
12 Williams v. United States Exp. Co. (1917) 195 Mo. App. 362, 191 S. W.
1087.
IS R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 2990--"Every corporation as such has power . . .
to sue and be sued, complain and defend in any court of law or equity". This
same provision may be found in R. S. Mo. (1929) Sec. 4555.
14 R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 2963--"The term 'corporation' as used in this chap-
ter shall be construed to include all joint stock companies or associations hav-
ing any powers or privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships."
This same provision may be found in R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 4526. An identical
provision is embodied in the Constitution of Missouri. Art. 12 Sec. 11.
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as rendered in the Metropolitan Street Railway Co. v. Adams Ex-
press Co. without comment. It explained that in the earlier case(the Adams Express Company case) these two statutory provi-
sions had not been considered.
In the case of Weichtuechter v. Miller,10 the plaintiff Wiech-
tuechter sued in his representative capacity as secretary of the
American International Musical and Theatrical Union, a volun-
tary association, against defendants for an alleged slander. Up-
on a demurrer to the plaintiff's petition the question of plaintiff's
legal capacity to sue was raised. In disposing of the case the Su-
preme Court held that such a suit as this could be maintained in
the name of the association under the reasoning found in the
United States Express Company case. Since the suit could be
maintained in the name of the association, the petition was bad on
demurrer because the suit was not brought in the name of the real
party in interest. Although this was a negative decision as to
the association's suability, still it is most interesting to find theSupreme Court sanctioning suit in tort by this unincorporated
group.
In 1922 the St. Louis Court of Appeals considered the case of
Bruns v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union.17 The father of a deceased
member of the union sued the union, an unincorporated associa-
tion, for the sum of $500 as provided by the by-laws of the organi-
zation. The union presented its unincorporated status as a de-
fense to the suit, but the defense proved ineffective. The decision
was based upon section 1186, Revised Statutes Missouri (1919)18
which provided in express terms that unincorporated associa-
tions might be sued in their common name and validly served by
merely serving the president or other officer of the association.
"Such an organization as this," said the court, "is a legal entity
and entitled to sue and be sued the same as a corporation." The
Kansas City Court of Appeals followed the Bruns case without
a discussion of the question when it considered the case of Me-
' See note 11, supra.
16 (1918) 270 Mo. 322, 208 S. W. 39.
17 (1922) 242 S. W. 419.
18 The opinion was based upon subdivision seven in that section. This pro-
vision originated in Laws 1915 p. 225. It is now R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 728.
Subdivision seven is as follows: "where any action shall be commenced
against any voluntary or unincorporated association or organization it may
be sued in the name it has selected or by which it is known or uses and sum-
mons may be served on it by delivering a copy of the writ and petition to thepresident or other officer . . ., and when had (service) in conformity here-
with shall be deemed personal service against such voluntary or unincorpo-
rated association or organization and authorize the rendition of a generaljudgment against it".
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol18/iss3/5
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Intyre v. Live Stock Shipping Association.19 In overruling the de-
fendant association's contention that all its members must be
made parties to the suit, the court merely said that Bruns V.
Driver's Union and Williams v. Express Co. controlled the case
under review.
With section 118620 to be found in the statutes it would seem
there should no longer be any question of the right to sue a volun-
tary association in its own name. The language clearly provides
such a suit may be had.21
However, the Supreme Court of Missouri subsequently ruled
that this section could not be given its full literal effect, because of
the restrictions in the Missouri Constitution that the title of every
statute must reveal its contents.22 The title of this act merely
stated that it was an act to amend a named section of the revised
statutes of 1909. This former section was solely concerned with
declaring how service might be made upon individuals and cor-
porations which were already suable entities. The court held
that it was improper to add wholly new and unrelated provisions
to a statute by way of amendment to it. Therefore, the statute
could not constitutionally be allowed to create new suable entities,
although it was upheld in so far as it merely regulated how already
existing suable entities might be served.
Two years after the unconstitutionality of this statute had
been determined, the St. Louis Court of Appeals had occasion to
pass upon the suability of an unincorporated labor union.2 3 It
was a suit upon a contract of insurance made by the union. The
court recognized that section 1186 Revised Statutes Missouri(1919) had been declared unconstitutional in so far as it made
voluntary associations suable entities. But, reasoned the court,
this union had powers and privileges not possessed by individuals
or partnerships and was therefore a suable entity without the aid
of the unconstitutional statute. It may be noted that the court
did not enumerate any powers or privileges, nor did it give a hint
as to what specific ones it had considered.
The Supreme Court reviewed the case of Newton County Fruit
Growers v. Southern Railway Co.24 in 1930 and denied the Grow-
ers' Association the right to sue in its own name. The petition
alleged the association was not a corporation, but that it possessed
powers and privileges not possessed by individuals or partner-
ships and hence was capable of suing as a corporation. The
19 (1928) 222 Mo. App. 935, 11 S. W. (2d) 77.20 R. S. Mo. (1919).
21 See note 18, supra, for express language referred to.22 ayes v. United Garment Workers of America (1928) 320 Mo. 10, 6 S. W.
(2d) 333.
23 Syz v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union (1930) 24 S. W. (2d) 1080.
24 (1930) 326 Mo. 617, 31 S. W. (2d) 803.
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court reasoned that it was not enough merely to allege that there
are exceptional powers and privileges which an association pos-
sesses; the statute which grants these must be set forth. At
common law such an association did not have power to sue. Un-
less there is a statute which grants it privileges not possessed by
individuals or partnerships, suit in the association's name is im-
possible.
In the case of Clark v. Grand Lodge,25 the Supreme Court con-
sidered the suability question again and, in its opinion, gave a full
discussion and review of many of the leading Missouri cases on
the question. The suit, in this instance, was on a contract of in-
surance made by the defendant unincorporated labor organiza-
tion. The defendant's defense that it could not be sued proved
ineffective. The court found that Missouri statutes, regulating
and governing the insurance business, recognized that such busi-
ness could be carried on by voluntary associations as well as by
corporations and individuals.26 "Contracts are not contracts
unless they are enforceable. To say that an association like the
defendant can make contracts necessarily means valid contracts-
contracts that are binding on the parties and enforceable against
them. It is an absurdity to say that defendant can make con-
tracts of insurance, but cannot be sued thereon. If it is a legal
entity when making such contracts, it retains such legal entity
when sued thereon". This was the basis of the decision, but it
was also suggested that the doctrine of estoppel might well be ap-
plied to such a situation. It was pointed out that this association
was composed of over a hundred thousand members and had the
appearance and employed the method of doing business of a cor-
poration. It chose a name and did a business under that name as
a legal entity. It made contracts in that name and when sued on
those contracts in the name it used in making them, "it ought not
be allowed to say that it is a mere myth--an intangible non-entity
incapable of being sued."
While the court in Clark v. Grand Lodge holds that this associa-
tion was a suable entity so long as the suit is on a contract made in
the association name, it nevertheless is careful to point out that it
does not intend to go as far as the Supreme Court of United States
did in United Mine Workers v. Coronade Coal Co.27 and hold that
2 (1931) 328 Mo. 1084, 43 S. W. (2d) 404.
26 R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 5670, 5990, 5994, 5997, 6002, 6021.
-7 (1922) 259 U. S. 344. In this case, with no statute expressly authorizing
suit against unincorporated labor unions, the Supreme Court allowed suit
against the United Mine Workers, finding that state and federal statutes had
from time to time been enacted touching labor unions in various respects and
that these statutory provisions were "affirmativ7 legal recognition of their
existence". Since, the court reasoned, their "existence" had been "recog-
nized", they were suable in their association name.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol18/iss3/5
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an unincorporated association is suable in actions sounding in
tort.
Clark v. Grand Lodge was decided in 1931. One year later the
suability question was again presented to the Supreme Court in
the case of Ruggles v. International Association of Iron Workers.25
In the plaintiff's petition it was alleged that the defendant was a
voluntary association, having powers and privileges not possessed
by individuals or partnerships, but as in the Newton County
Fruit Growers case, the petition failed to show the source of any
such powers. The allegations were held to be mere conclusions,
and the plaintiff's right to sue was denied. The court did not
overrule the decision of Clark v. Grand Lodge, but attempted to
distinguish the two. In the Clark case the suit was on a contract
of insurance, but in the Ruggles case the plaintiff was asking dam-
ages for being wrongfully deprived of the privileges of member-
ship in the organization.
There are other cases, involving the suability question in some
degree, which have not been mentioned in this discussion. They
may be grouped in two classes. (1) Those cases in which suabil-
ity is allowed without mention or discussion of the fact;20 (2)
Those cases in which the suability question is discussed in dicta.30
These cases are, no doubt, pertinent to some degree, but none of
them have been considered by the courts in arriving at a conclu-
sion upon the suability of a particular association when the ques-
tion has been presented. I may be well, therefore, to make no
further mention of them.
By way of summary a few conclusions may be drawn from the
cases discussed. Generalizations are impossible, but it may well
be said that the common law rule is a general principle which may
be invoked from time to time. If an unincorporated association
possesses "powers" or "privileges" not possessed by individuals
or partnerships, the association may sue or be sued. That seems
28 (1932) 52 S. W. (2d) 860.
29 Missouri Bottlers' Ass'n v. Tinnerty (1889) 81 Mo. App. 525. This case
involved a suit by an unincorporated association against an expelled member
of the organization, on an account admitted to be owing. A defense was set
up that the association was a partnership and could only sue in equity in suit
for an accounting. The court held that the association was not a partnership
and that equity was not the proper place for this suit. Without further dis-
cussion the court found the defendant owed the organization the money and
allowed the unincorporated association to recover. See also: O'Nal v.
Grand Lodge (1924) 216 Mo. App. 212, 261 S. W. 128.
30 Lilly v. Tobbein (1891) 103 Mo. 477, 15 S. W. 618; Miller Lumber Co. v.
Oliver (1896) 65 Mo. App. 435; Moore v. Stemmons (1906) 119 Mo. App. 162,
95 S. W. 313; State ex rel. Great Am. Home Say. Inst. v. Lee (1921) 288 Mo.
679, 233 S. W. 20.
For effect of conveyance (of land) to a partnership and unincorporated as-
sociations see Arthur v. Westan and Stroda (1856) 22 Mo. 378; Douthitt v.
Stimson (1876) 63 Mo. 268.
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to be good law and might certainly be a helpful rule if there were
any evidence in the cases as to what the nature of these powers
must be. From the opinions in Newton County Fruit Growers
Association v. Southern Railway and Ruggles v. Iron Workers As-
sociation it appears that these powers must be derived from the
statutes and that the statutes must be pleaded before the suability
attribute will attach. With Clark v. Grand Lodge as a precedent it
can be said that an association which has made a contract of in-
surance is a suable entity in so far as the association may be sued
upon that contract. Whether a suit or an ordinary contract
would be allowed seems doubtful in view of the decision in Ruggles
v. Iron Workers Association. The opinion in the case of Clark V.
Grand Lodge shows a reluctance to recognize an unincorporated
association as a suable entity for purpose of a suit in nature of a
tort. However, it is submitted that allowing such a suit would
not be without precedent. 31
To-day there are many unincorporated associations, such as the
labor unions. They have thousands of members, are efficiently
organized, hold valuable property and large sums of money, and
conduct business in furtherance of the ends of the organization.
The need for a practical method of suing these groups as entities
is self-evident. The Missouri Courts have met this situation only
partially, but effectively in some instances.
LESTER E. BARRETT '33.
ENLARGEMENT OF LIFE ESTATES TO FEES SIMPLE BY
THE ANNEXATION OF A POWER
There seems to be a great deal of learned argument on the part
of the courts and the authorities in the State of Missouri as to the
status of executory limitations. It has been suggested by Mr.
McCune Gill 1 that there is a "remarkable body of law" on the sub-
ject in this state. "An analysis of these elements in these forty-
nine cases shows that it is quite impossible to deduce a rule from
the decisions. The limitations seem to have been upheld or dis-
regarded and the supposed intention of the testator or grantor
a1 Consider the case of State v. Kansas City Stock Exchange note 9, supra.
See also Wiechtuechter v. Miller note 16 supra.
Professor Sturgis suggests in an article found in 33 Yale Law Journal 383
(1924) that the power to sue or be sued in their association name is denied
the unincorporated groups not because they have no legal entity separate and
distinct from their members, but because the courts feel the power is usurped
from the corporate franchise, which must lie in grant from the sovereign.
'A Limitation After a Fee Simple (1927) pamphlet written by McCune
Gill and published by the Title Insurance Corporation of St. Louis.
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